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Abstract
It is argued that biases such as anchoring and overconfidence 
contribute to a US$30 billion/year loss in the oil and gas 
industry (Goode, 2002). The most commonly used debiasing 
technique, within the industry, is awareness-style training, 
where participants have the biases and debiasing techniques 
described to them without specific training. Given such 
training is delivered by consultants, however, there is little
available evidence of its efficacy and concern regarding a lack 
of up to date debiasing methods. We present a study designed 
to measure the benefit of such awareness-style training for the 
well-known anchoring and overconfidence biases, using a 
sample of petroleum engineering students. Results indicate 
that course attendance reduced participants’ overconfidence -
calibration improving by 21% - but no benefit was observed 
for anchoring. It is argued that this difference results from the 
debiasing technique for anchoring requiring a greater degree 
of domain knowledge than the students possessed. A detailed 
analysis of the relationship between accuracy in, and 
susceptibility to, the anchoring question supported this –
indicating that participants who simply relied on the anchor 
actually performed better than those who hazarded their own 
guesses. Potential benefits of debiasing and, specifically, the 
incorporation of up to date debiasing techniques, are 
discussed along with the need for further research.
Keywords: decision making; debiasing; anchoring;
overconfidence; oil and gas; judgment.
Introduction
Previous research has demonstrated that most people are 
susceptible to cognitive biases when making decisions or
judgments under conditions of uncertainty (Morgan & 
Henrion, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, 
people tend to give responses that are systematically biased 
compared to calculated, optimal solutions as a result of the 
simplified mechanisms that our brains use to make 
judgments.
Two of the most commonly discussed biases are: 
anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which describes 
the tendency people have to base estimates on any number 
at hand regardless of its relevance to the question at hand 
(Chapman & Johnson, 2002); and overconfidence
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), which describes the tendency of people 
to give too narrow bounds when asked to set a range that 
they are certain to some stated level of confidence that a 
value will fall within.
In an industry such as oil and gas, biased decision-making 
can be extremely expensive; industry observers argue that 
such biases are, in part at least, responsible for the large 
losses in the oil industry – one recent estimate being that 
unexpected outcomes during exploration cost the industry 
US$30 billion each year (Goode, 2002). With the cost of 
drilling a single, off-shore well regularly exceeding US$60
million, the estimates of technical parameters that feed into 
the models of oil fields used to predict oil reserves can have 
a huge impact on whether a company chooses to drill or 
walk away from a prospect. If these estimates are subject to 
cognitive biases – as most judgments under uncertainty are 
– the accuracy of these models are also compromised and 
poor decisions will result.
Biases in Oil and Gas Decisions
The question for the industry, of course, is: which biases are 
affecting oil and gas decisions and how can these be 
reduced? This question has not, of course, avoided 
investigation. Within a few years of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) groundbreaking work on biases, Capen 
(1976) introduced the concept of overconfidence to the 
industry – demonstrating its effect on oil and gas 
professionals. In 2002, however, Hawkins, Cunningham and 
Coopersmith (2002) noted that less than half of observed 
values fell inside the 80% confidence intervals commonly 
used for predicting uncertain parameters in the oil industry, 
which seems clearly indicative of overconfidence’s 
continued impact. Merkhofer (1987) has generalized the 
results of these type of studies to the “2/50” rule: When 
people are asked to provide estimates of quantities lying 
between their 1% and 99% confidence limits (that is, with 
only a 2% chance of being wrong), usually about 50% of the 
answers fall outside this range and, thus, they are 
overconfident in their predictions.
Many oil and gas professionals are also familiar with the 
anchoring bias, through the work of Rose (2001), but other 
biases are rarely mentioned (see Pieters, 2004 for a recent 
exception). This is regarded as particularly damaging due to 
the use of analogs in oil and gas decision-making. That is, 
given the scarcity of data on a new oil prospect, analogous 
prospects are used to inform estimates of the parameters of 
interest. These analogue parameters, however, are widely 
regarded as acting as anchors on estimates (Rose, 2001).
Despite three decades of bias research, however, attempts 
at improving oil and gas decision-making have primarily 
focused on improving decision tools rather than looking at 
the impact of biases on industry decisions. Given that this 
approach has not demonstrated clear improvements in the 
industry’s economic outcomes (Bratvold, Begg, & 
Campbell, 2002), however, more attention is now being 
paid by the industry to cognitive biases and, in particular, 
methods for debiasing judgments.
Debiasing Oil and Gas Decisions
Debiasing refers to any technique designed to avoid or 
reduce susceptibility to bias (Larrick, 2004). As noted 
above, the oil and gas industry, while focused primarily on 
improving decision tools, has been aware of the existence of 
cognitive biases for a significant period. In that time, a 
number of groups have looked at the possibility of debiasing 
industry decisions.
Pete Rose, for example, has been offering training in 
decision-making since soon after Capen’s (1976) original 
introduction of the concept of biases to oil and gas and 
discusses what he calls the “prospector myth” (Rose, 2001), 
which incorporates anchoring and overconfidence. 
Campbell, Campbell and Campbell (2001), similarly discuss 
both anchoring and overconfidence.
The courses offered by such industry providers are, 
typically, short and intensive with the biases being 
demonstrated to the participants in general terms, using 
general questions. One concern for people interested in 
establishing the efficacy of such awareness-based debiasing, 
however, is that the groups offering this service are 
consultants whose primary goal is to confidentially aid their 
clients rather than publish their methods and results.
A second concern is that the techniques commonly 
described as being beneficial for debiasing tend not to be 
included in these courses. For example, it is widely accepted 
(for a review of studies, see: Morgan & Henrion, 1990) that 
overconfidence is best reduced using repeated feedback. 
That is, giving people sets of calibration questions and then 
showing them how often the true answers to the questions 
falls within their estimated ranges, before giving them 
further sets of questions. Such intensive training is generally 
not possible in the short industry courses.
By comparison with overconfidence, for which debiasing 
techniques are well-known, susceptibility to anchoring is
seen to be extremely robust (Chapman & Johnson, 2002),
with little literature on debiasing other than Wilson, 
Houston, Etling and Brekke (1996), who argue that - while 
knowledge of the anchoring effect is ineffective, high levels 
of knowledge about the subject matter enable anchoring to 
be avoided. Their data, however, do not necessarily support 
this statement. While the “high knowledge” groups they 
describe are less susceptible to the anchors they used, they 
are no more accurate in their estimates – indicating that they 
might be better described as high confidence rather than 
high knowledge, especially given that their level of 
knowledge was self-reported.
Similarly, Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer’s (2000)
contention that a “consider the opposite” strategy reduces 
the anchoring effect assumes that the true answer is already 
known to the elicitor (if not the elicitee) -  which is certainly 
not the case in oil and gas where uncertainty about the true 
state of the world remains throughout the decision-making 
process. A variant that does not require prior knowledge of 
the answer is possible, however, where participants are told 
to adjust their estimates away from the anchor – the 
assumption being that the participant has some degree of 
knowledge and thus that their biased estimate lies between 
the anchor they saw and the hypothetical, unbiased estimate 
they otherwise would have made.
These observations, together, indicate another problem in 
anchoring research that must be addressed before it can be 
transferred to real world contexts such as oil and gas. 
Specifically, previous research has not clarified the 
relationship between accuracy and susceptibility in 
anchoring tasks. In real world environments, the goal of 
reducing bias is, of course, to produce more accurate 
estimates – not simply estimates that lie further from the 
anchoring value. The assumption, given an expert sample, 
would be that reducing the effect of the bias leads to greater 
accuracy but this relationship has yet to be shown.
Research Questions
Given the above, three research questions were formulated.
The first two focus on the ability of awareness-style training 
in biases and debiasing techniques to reduce susceptibility 
to the two most talked about biases in the oil and gas 
context – anchoring and overconfidence. The final question 
asks whether the proposed, inverse relationship between 
accuracy and susceptibility in an anchoring task exists.
1. Does awareness of anchoring reduce susceptibility 
to anchoring?
2. Does awareness of overconfidence reduce 
susceptibility to overconfidence?




Data was collected from 51 petroleum engineering students, 
37 males and 14 females, with a mean age of 22.6 (SD = 
3.5). While not a sample of industry experts, all of the 
students were in their final year of study and thus possessed 
technical industry knowledge.
Questionnaires
The primary questionnaire used was prepared for teaching 
purposes and, as such, included a wide range of cognitive 
biases, including anchoring and overconfidence. The 
questionnaire used to test for improvement following 
training, however, repeated only the anchoring and 
overconfidence questions.
The anchoring question asked participants to estimate the 
world’s proved oil reserves in billions of barrels. This 
question was preceded by a question asking whether the 
value was greater or less than either 573.9 or 1721.6 billion 
barrels (the low and high anchors, being one-half and one–
and-one-half times the researched value of 1147.7, 
respectively). The ten overconfidence questions, by 
comparison all asked participants to set ranges that they 
were 80% confident that some oil industry value (e.g., the 
USA’s daily oil imports) fell within.
Procedure
Participants were handed the primary questionnaire and 
allowed 45 minutes to complete the questions. Immediately 
following this, they received 3 hours of lectures on the 
psychology of decision-making, cognitive biases and 
debiasing techniques – as part of a 5 day intensive short 
course on decision making in the oil and gas industry. This 
course was theoretical in nature – simple examples of the 
various biases and debiasing techniques were shown but no 
training, as such, was given. 
A single method for debiasing anchoring was described –
participants simply being told to adjust their estimates 
further away from the anchor in accordance with the 
hypothesis regarding the hypothetical, unbiased estimate 
described earlier.
However, three methods for debiasing overconfidence 
were described that could be used by a person to debias their 
own estimates: a simple warning that people tend to be 
overconfident and that they should, therefore, make their 
estimated ranges wider (Lichtenstein et al., 1982);
consideration of counter-factuals, or reasons that the value 
might fall outside the initially estimated range (Hawkins et 
al., 2002); and the use of initial best guesses, which has 
been demonstrated to lead to wider ranges (Block & Harper, 
1991). An interesting aside regarding this last method, 
however, is that the majority of industry courses assume the 
opposite – that asking for a best guess first reduces the 
width of estimated ranges, in accordance with Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) original, untested hypothesis – and 
teach this to their students as fact.
While using more up-to-date recommendations, the 
training format used here otherwise parallels the training 
courses used in the oil and gas industry by consultants and, 
as such, offers a good indication of the efficacy of 
awareness as a debiasing method. After receiving the 
lectures, participants were given the follow-up questionnaire 
and allowed 30 minutes to complete it.
Data Transformations
In order to enable measurement of participants’ 
susceptibility to the two biases, their raw estimates for the 
anchoring task and their raw calibration score for the
overconfidence task were transformed into susceptibility 
scores as follows:
Sanch = - | E – A | (1)
Where E is the participant’s estimate and A the anchoring 
value they saw.
Sover = - | 8 – C | (2)
Where C is the participant’s calibration score out of 10. 
Note that for both susceptibility values, Sanch and Sover, 
higher scores indicate greater susceptibility to the relevant 
bias.
In addition to these susceptibility scores, accuracy scores 
were calculated for the anchoring responses – reflecting the 
distance that participants’ estimates lay from the true 
researched answer to the question. That is:
Aanch = - | E - 1147.7 | (3)
Where E is the participant’s estimate and 1147.7 is the 




Forty-four participants provided valid responses to the 
anchoring question both pre- and post-training. Their
responses were extremely variable and positively skewed, 
with many more high than low estimates. For this reason, 
the medians and interquartile ranges of participants’ 
estimates under the two anchoring conditions, both pre- and 
post-training, are shown in Figure 1, rather than means and 
standard deviations.
Looking at Figure 1, it is clear that participants showed a 
strong anchoring effect, with estimates made in the low 
anchor condition being significantly lower than those made 
in the high anchor condition both pre- and post-training. 
There also seems to be some evidence of improvement, with 
the median estimates of both groups falling noticeably 
closer to the true value post-training. A repeated measures 
ANOVA, however, conducted to test the strength of these 
effects, found that while anchor group was significant, 
F(3,84) = 11.95, p< .001, there was no significant effect of 
training or any interaction between training and anchor 
group. That is, no support was found for Hypothesis 1 – that 
awareness of anchoring would reduce susceptibility to the 
bias.
To separate out the effects of susceptibility to the bias and 
accuracy, finer-grained analyses examined the changes in 
susceptibility to anchoring and in accuracy (calculated from 
equations 1 and 3, above) across the training conditions 
separately. Figure 2 shows the mean susceptibility to 
anchoring and mean accuracy of participants in both 
anchoring conditions, pre- and post-training. Here one sees 
a different pattern of results for the two anchoring 
conditions, with the participants seeing the low anchor 
becoming less susceptible and more accurate after training 
but the participants in the high anchor condition reacting in 
the opposite manner – becoming more susceptible and less 
accurate after training.
A repeated measures ANOVA undertaken to examine the 
susceptibility results indicated that the difference in 
susceptibility between the pre- and post-training sessions 
was not significant but confirmed that a significant 
interaction effect existed between training and anchor 
group, F(1,42)=4.25, p=.045. A second repeated measures 
ANOVA, examining the accuracy results, similarly found 
no significant main effect of training on accuracy and, in 
this case, the interaction effect between training and anchor 
group also failed to reach significance, F(1,42)=3.54, 
p=.067. Taken together, these results support the earlier 
observation that the training did not have either of the 
expected effects of reducing susceptibility or increasing 
accuracy – instead differentially affecting participants who 
had seen the high and low anchors.
As a final test of Hypothesis 3, correlations were 
calculated between participant’s accuracy and susceptibility 
scores. In the pre-training condition, the correlation was 
almost perfect, r(42)=0.98, p<.001, and it remained strong 
in the post-training data as well, r(42)=0.79, p<.001. The 
counterintuitive implication of this is that the more accurate 
participants were those who relied most heavily on the 




















Figure 1. Median estimates of world proved oil reserves, 
with interquartile ranges, by anchoring and training 
conditions. The horizontal line indicates the researched 




















Figure 2. Mean susceptibility (Sanch) and accuracy (Aanch) 
scores from the anchoring task, by anchoring condition 
(high vs low), pre- and post-training.
Overconfidence
All 51 participants gave valid responses to the set of 10 
calibration questions used for assessing overconfidence. The 
calibration scores of participants – that is, the number of hits 
out of 10 from the ranges set in response to the 10 
calibration questions – are summarized in Figure 3, which 
shows the proportion of participants achieving each possible 
calibration score and compares these to the expected 
distribution for participants accurately setting 80% 
confidence intervals on each question.
The clearest effect in Figure 3 is the general trend of 
overconfidence – the majority of participants scoring below 
5/10, compared to less than 1% of participants who would 
be expected to do so if accurately setting 80% confidence 
intervals. Goodness-of-fit tests confirmed that participants, 
pre- and post-training, differed significantly from the 
expected distribution of results, 2(10)=3.85x105 and 
1.62x105, p<.001 and p<.001, respectively.
The data in Figure 3 also, however, show an improvement 
in calibration following training; the mean calibration score 
prior to training being 2.6 (SD=2.3) and rising to 4.7 
(SD=2.6) after training. A repeated measure t-test indicated 
that this change was significant, t(50)=3.71, p<.001, 
offering support for Hypothesis 2, which holds that 















Figure 3. Histogram of pre- and post-training calibration 
scores compared with expected values assuming accurate 




The results are mixed in terms of evaluating the efficacy of 
awareness-style training in debiasing, with support found 
for only one of the three hypotheses examined herein: 
Hypothesis 2, which argued that overconfidence would be 
reduced by making the participants aware of the effect and 
methods of avoiding or reducing it. This result and the 
failure to find support for the remaining hypotheses are 
discussed in greater detail below.
Hypothesis 1: Debiasing Anchoring 
As noted above, no evidence was found that anchoring 
susceptibility was reduced or that participants’ accuracy 
improved after being made aware of the anchoring bias and 
having a single technique described to attempt to avoid it.
There seem to be at least two possible explanations for 
this. The first, of course, is that the debiasing method 
described to the participant’s simply does not work. 
Logically, however, this seems unlikely. If, as described 
above, a person makes an estimate that has been biased by 
their viewing of an anchor – then moving that estimate away 
from the anchor should reduce the bias and lead to more 
accurate estimates, assuming that the adjustment does not 
overshoot the true value.
What seems more likely is that the participants used
herein did not have sufficient knowledge of the subject 
about which they were asked for such a technique to be 
useful to them. As noted above, the technique assumes a
hypothetical unbiased estimate constructed from a person’s 
other knowledge that is biased by the presence of the 
anchor. In the absence of such domain knowledge that 
enables a person to determine which side of the anchor the 
true value should lie on, then, adjusting one’s estimate away 
from the anchor is, in effect, random. The discussion of this 
possibility is taken up again in the discussion of Hypothesis 
3, below.
Hypothesis 2: Debiasing Overconfidence
In contrast to the failure to reduce anchoring, clear evidence 
was found in support of the hypothesis that awareness of 
overconfidence and debiasing techniques would enable 
people to reduce their level of overconfidence.
The participants, after training, had mean calibration 
scores of 4.7, up from 2.6. While even post-training the 
participants remained markedly overconfident, this 
improvement represents the number of surprises (values 
falling outside the predicted range) falling by 21%. It is also 
interesting to note that, post-training, the student 
participants described herein outperformed an industry 
sample who scored an average of 4.2 on the same questions 
(Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2005).
Needless to say, an improvement even a fraction of the 
size observed here in oil and gas industry predictions could,
potentially, save billions of dollars per annum.
Hypothesis 3: Accuracy and Susceptibility 
The failure of the data to support Hypothesis 3, which 
predicted that accuracy would be inversely related to 
susceptibility on the anchoring task, is the most surprising 
but also perhaps the most interesting of the results.
The extremely strong positive correlations between the 
accuracy and susceptibility measures indicate, against 
expectations, that participants who rely more heavily on the 
anchor ended up making more accurate estimates. This is 
interesting as it indicates the adaptive value of the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic itself. That is, this result shows that
it can be a rational strategy to rely on the anchor.
Given the observation made above - that the students may 
not have had sufficient knowledge of the field in which they 
were being asked questions to enable them to debias their 
responses - it follows that they had no realistic constraints 
on what their answer to the anchoring question might be. By 
comparison, the anchoring values used in the experiment 
were chosen such that they would seem reasonable to people 
with a degree of industry knowledge; specifically, being set 
at one-half and one-and-one-half times the researched value. 
In the absence of alternate knowledge, therefore, the 
anchoring value at least constrained the estimates of 
participants who relied on them to the correct order of 
magnitude while participants who ignored the anchors were 
able to give wildly wrong estimates. That is, given no 
alternate knowledge, reliance on the anchor improved a 
participant’s odds of giving an estimate close to the true 
value.
Clearly, this effect will be restricted to a subset of 
environments where the anchors being used are at least 
somewhat informative. It is, however, worth noting that the 
standard greater/less than format used in anchoring 
questions reflects environments in which this would hold -
as cut-offs used for such questions are usually set within the 
response range considered credible by the question’s writer.
Further Research
The results suggest a number of interesting research 
directions. Firstly, although previous research has indicated 
relatively little difference between industry and non-
industry personnel in terms of bias susceptibility (Welsh et 
al., 2005), assessment of the benefit accrued by industry 
personnel sitting a training course like the one described 
here still needs to be undertaken. In particular, such work 
needs to take in to account the lower starting level of 
overconfidence that such personnel have been observed to 
have (Welsh et al., 2005) – an obvious concern being that 
the relative improvement might be less for people whose 
overconfidence is already lower and whose confidence in 
their own judgments is higher.
Research is also needed to establish the relationship 
between knowledge and susceptibility to anchoring more 
clearly. As noted above, previous studies (e.g., Wilson et al., 
1996) have allowed self-reporting of a participant’s level of 
knowledge. This needs to be corrected by measuring 
participants’ knowledge of a domain and then assessing 
their susceptibility to anchoring within that area. Then
participants with varying degrees of knowledge could be 
introduced to the debiasing technique described above for 
the anchoring bias and the hypothesized relationship 
between knowledge and anchoring could be tested.
Finally, the benefits of debiasing for a wider range of 
known cognitive biases needs to be considered. While 
biases beyond anchoring and overconfidence are rarely 
spoken of in oil and gas, there are strong arguments that 
effects such as framing and availability are impacting 
industry decisions (Kruger & Evans, 2004; Pieters, 2004)
and thus effective debiasing techniques for these biases are 
also needed.
Conclusions
The results presented above offer some hope for oil and gas 
companies that are banking on better economic outcomes 
resulting from investment in awareness-style training for 
their staff. Were attendance at such training courses to 
provide a decrease in overconfidence comparable to that 
observed herein on the technical parameter estimations 
made by industry personnel, then the benefits in terms of 
improved economic forecasting would easily be in the 
billions of dollars per annum across the industry. That said, 
a number of caveats remain.
Firstly, while overconfidence was shown reduced by the 
training, the training used herein made use of at least one 
debiasing technique that industry courses do not and which, 
in fact, they specifically recommend against (see, e.g., 
Campbell et al., 2001): the use of best guesses. It is also 
worth noting that, while improvement was observed, the 
participants were still markedly overconfident post-training.
The concern regarding the content of current industry 
courses must also extend to anchoring and other biases. 
While anchoring, at least, is commonly mentioned, there is 
little evidence that specific debiasing techniques for it are 
currently being taught or that any benefit is obtained from 
simple awareness-style training. Other biases have simply 
not yet been raised to the industry’s consciousness.
Finally, the fact that the same question set was used to test 
participants both pre- and post-training may also strike some 
as problematic. It should, however, be kept in mind that the 
participants received no specific feedback on their answers 
to any of the questions prior to completing the post-training 
questionnaire. The training used general examples only, 
which argues against any improvement in accuracy having 
occurred simply as a result of the test-retest format. 
Differences between the conditions can thus safely be 
argued to reflect the effect of training.
To conclude, research into biases and debiasing 
techniques has the potential to benefit the oil and gas 
industry to the tune of billions of dollars per year but a great 
deal of work remains to be done before this could be 
realized. The industry’s current, awareness-style training, 
while having a demonstrable effect, is outdated and 
incomplete and would see an immediate benefit from the 
incorporation of more recent research on biases.
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